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INTRODUCHION
The Telecommunications Act of 1996' implemented two com-
peting views of broadcasters' roles and their rights to use the air-
waves.2 Section 201 of the Act treats broadcasters as holders of
rights that can be exchanged with the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC) in a market-like transaction:3 if the FCC is-
sues additional licenses for advanced television broadcast services,4
the statute requires the FCC to limit initial eligibility to broadcast-
ers who possess a current license.' In exchange, those broad-
casters surrender their original licenses.6 Section 204 significantly
increases current license terms.7 By prohibiting the FCC from
considering competitors for a license at renewal and by extending
license terms, the Act appears to guarantee an unprecedented lon-
gevity for broadcasters' current rights to use the airwaves and to
transform a temporary and conditional broadcast license into one
of virtually permanent duration.
Interestingly, these provisions coexist with other provisions of
the Act that treat broadcasters as public trustees. Under the Act's
"public trustee" provisions, broadcasters' rights to use the airwaves
1. Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996) (to be codified at scattered sections of
47 U.S.C.).
2. Generally, "airwaves" refers to those portions of the electromagnetic spectrum
used in broadcast communications, cellular phones, airport radar, satellites, and garage
door openers. See Frank James, Politicians See Airwave Sales as Easy Money, CHm. TREB.,
Sept. 1, 1996, at C3. This Note focuses on the use of airwaves for broadcast communica-
tion, i.e. radio and television.
3. § 201, 110 Stat. at 107 (amending 47 U.S.C. by adding § 336).
4. Advanced television uses digital signals, which produce a sharper, cleaner picture
than does conventional, analog television. See Jeannine Aversa, Digital TV Nearer After
FCC Decree, AUSTiN AMBRICAN-STATEsMAN, July 26, 1996, at A19.
5. See § 201(a), 110 Stat. at 107.
6. See § 201(c), 110 Stat. at 108 ("If the Commission grants a license for advanced
television services ... the Commission shall, as a condition of such license, require that
either the additional license or the original license ... be surrendered to the Commis-
sion for reallocation or reassignment.").
7. See § 204(a)(4), 110 Stat. at 113 (amending 47 U.S.C. § 309).
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are allocated and attach not on the basis of what the broadcasters
"own" and can exchange, but rather on the basis of "public inter-
est, convenience, and necessity."'
This tension-between a vision of broadcasters as market par-
ticipants, with whom government must bargain to exchange re-
sources, and a vision of broadcasters as public trustees who use
the airwaves for public benefit-is apparent in public debate as
well as in legislation.9 The claim that the airwaves belong to the
public is at the base of calls for access to broadcast facilities,"0
improved children's programming," and auctions of the air-
waves."2 But despite these appeals to the concept of public own-
ership, public debate also presents broadcasters as market partici-
pants.' 3 The responsibilities of public trustees and market partici-
pants differ, however: these two visions are often inconsistent.
8. § 201(d), 110 Stat. at 108.
9. See Aversa, supra note 4, at A19. One commentator has criticized broadcasters
for thinking "they own the ether," and for dismissing "the concept of what used to be
called the 'public airwaves."' Joanne Ostrow, Media Monsters Keep Getting Bigger, More
Powerf4 DENVER POST, June 26, 1996, at G1.
10. For example, Pat Choate, the Reform Party's candidate for Vice-President, has
argued that one reason he should not have been excluded from the 1996 Vice-Presiden-
tial debates is that the debates were to be broadcast on "the public's airwaves." Inter-
view with Pat Choate, Vice-Presidential Candidate, Reform Party (Morning Edition, Na-
tional Public Radio broadcast, Sept. 20, 1996) (transcript on file with author).
11. Reed Hundt, the current FCC Chairman, has emphasized the concept of public
ownership of the airwaves when encouraging broadcasters to provide more educational
and children's programming. See Reed E. Hundt, The Public's Airwaves: What Does the
Public Interest Require of Television Broadcasters? 45 DuKE L.J. 1089, 1095 (1996). An-
other commentator takes for granted that broadcasters own a slice of the airwaves, argu-
ing that the federal government should simply "charge a fee for [the airwaves]," and
then use the money raised to create a trust fund for children's programming. Eric Mink,
Kid Content. Election Static, N.Y. DAILY NEws, June 4, 1996, at 67.
12. As Senate Majority Leader, Bob Dole used the concept of public ownership of
the airwaves to argue that rights to airwaves newly set aside for advanced television
should be given in exchange for auction-generated revenue, rather than in exchange for
existing licenses. See Waldo Proffitt, Dole vs. Communications Giants, SARASOTA HER-
ALD-TRiB., Aug. 14, 1996, at IIA.
13. For a critique that recognizes that the "public ownership" concept may ignore
the substance of regulation, see James, supra note 2, at C3. James argues that if the air-
waves are a public resource, then they should not be sold at all. "[O]nce you sell it, it's
never back in public hands." Id. Another commentator, however, sees the dual roles of a
broadcaster as complementary. See Shepard Nevel, Seeking Unfiltered Information, DEN-
VER POST, June 30, 1996, at D1 ("As profit-oriented businesses they can garner...
good will .... And as custodians of the public airwaves, they can improve the quality of
political discussion.").
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The debate about broadcasters' use of the "public's airwaves"
is, at center, a debate about ownership of an essentially intangible
resource, the electromagnetic spectrum.14 The concept of "owner-
ship" of portions of this spectrum is central to broadcast regula-
tion because it is central to the models on which broadcast regula-
tion has been based. Broadcasters have been regulated under two
different models: a public trust model and a private market mod-
el." The public trust model rests on public ownership of the elec-
tromagnetic spectrum. As owner, the public allocates to broad-
casters limited rights to use the electromagnetic spectrum. In re-
turn, broadcast licensees subordinate their interests to those of the
public. 6 In this model, broadcasters are essentially trustees of the
public's airwaves; government is the guardian of the public's inter-
ests.
The private market model, in contrast, rests on broadcasters'
status as owners of private property-that is, as owners of portions
of the electromagnetic spectrum. Broadcasters are thus endowed
with specific rights of ownership, including the right to control the
property's use, to exclude use by others, and to exercise discretion
in acquisition and transfer.' Broadcasters also secure these rights
14. The electromagnetic spectrum is a range of "electromagnetic radiations that travel
at the speed of light." Jora A. Minasian, Property Rights in Radiation: An Alternative
Approach to Radio Frequency Allocation, 18 J.L. & ECON. 221, 223 (1975). The energy
within this range has different characteristics depending on its frequency (i.e., the number
of waves that pass a fixed imaginary point in a second). See James, supra note 2, at 3.
A broadcaster and a listener are able to communicate if the listener's receiver is tuned
to the same frequency on which the broadcaster is sending its signal.
When sufficiently powerful, multiple signals are sent on the same (or nearly the
same) frequencies in a similar geographical area, they interfere with one another. See
HARvEy J. LEviN, THE INVISIBLE RESOURCE 17 (1971). When this interference occurs, it
results in a reduction of the quality of the desired signal. See id. The ability to prevent
this interference is, in part, what it means to own a portion of the electromagnetic spec-
trum. See Minasian, supra, at 228 ("The right to emit energy is virtually worthless with-
out a corresponding right to exclude.").
15. See Mark S. Fowler & Daniel L. Brenner, A Marketplace Approach to Broadcast
Regulation, 60 TEx. L. REV. 207, 209-13, 221-30 (1982) (arguing that a public trust para-
digm has failed and should be replaced with a market-based approach).
16. See infra notes 53-101 and accompanying text (discussing the public trust model
in broadcast regulation).
17. Theorists have different views of which characteristics inhere in a property right.
Jora A. Minasian has compiled a thoughtful list in the context of the electromagnetic
spectrum. See Minasian, supra note 14, at 232. The characteristics presented here are
substantially the same; they differ only in that Professor Minasian separates "emission
rights" and "admission rights," both of which I treat as part of the right to exclude.
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for some extended period of time. These private property rights
are allocated through price, which is not responsive to a
broadcaster's loyalty to the public interest. In this model, broad-
casters owe no obligation to the public-they please the public
only to profit from the use of the airwaves. 8 They are simply
players in a market; government's role is that of an arbiter among
many private interests competing for the use of a valuable, scarce
resource.
19
The history of broadcast regulation in the United States is a
history of the conflict between these models, in which public own-
ership has gradually given way to private ownership under the
private market model. This Note describes this conceptual shift.
Part I reviews the public trust model and describes its historical
role in broadcast regulation, especially its effect on the regulation
of broadcast content. Part II summarizes several principal criti-
cisms of the public trust model, and argues that these criticisms
have been influential in the shift to a private market model. Part
III discusses the expansion of private property rights in the elec-
tromagnetic spectrum, noting the particular effect of: 1) a growing
reliance interest in these rights, created by the relationship be-
tween broadcasters and the FCC;' 2) a deregulation philosophy
that has demanded that resources be allocated based on neutral,
The characteristics mentioned here also overlap with Antony Maurice Honord's six
incidents of property, as restated by Professor Munzer. See STEPHEN R. MUNZER, A
THEORY OF PROPERTY 22 (1990) (citing A.M. Honor6, Ownership, in OxFORD ESSAYS
IN JURISPRUDENCE (FIRST SERIES) 107-47 (A.G. Guest ed.) (1961)). Honor6's six inci-
dents are the following: 1) claim-rights to use, manage, and receive income, 2) powers to
transfer, waive, exclude, and abandon, 3) liberties to consume or destroy, 4) immunity
from expropriation, 5) duty not to use harmfully, 6) liability for execution to satisfy a
court judgment. See id. Because the six incidents are jointly sufficient, but not individ-
ually necessary, I have dropped the fifth and sixth incidents from the discussion; they are
of limited usefulness when discussing the electromagnetic spectrum.
18. See infra notes 154-252 and accompanying text (discussing the importance of pri-
vate property rights to the private market model).
19. See Fowler & Brenner, supra note 15, at 211; Richard NV. Stevens, Anarchy in
the Skip Zone: A Proposal for Market Allocation of High Frequency Spectrum, 41 FED.
COMM. L. 43, 66 (1988) (comparing administrative control and adjustment of private
interests).
20. A party's reliance on administrative regulation or rules can help to establish
private property rights. See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 987 (1984) (hold-
ing that an agency must recognize certain investment-backed expectations as property
rights); see also Joseph William Singer, The Reliance Interest in Property, 40 STAN. L.
REV. 611, 699 (1988) (arguing that property rights can arise from certain long-established
relationships).
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market-based criteria;2' and 3) the United States Supreme Court's
First Amendment jurisprudence, which has increased broadcasters'
editorial discretion at the expense of public control.
I. THE PUBLIC TRUST MODEL
The common law doctrine of the public trust is based on
common or public ownership.2 Under English common law, com-
mon property was held by the sovereign in trust for the citi-
zens.' American common law adopted this same doctrine;24
courts held that land which had been held in trust by the English
sovereign (the Crown) vested in the American sovereign (the
people) after the American Revolution 5 The public trust doc-
trine requires that certain property be used for public benefit, be-
cause of either its unique characteristics or its essentially public
nature. It may mean that the owner of otherwise privately-owned
property is required to provide public access;' it may also pre-
clude private ownership altogether.27 Together, public access and
the impossibility of private ownership form the basis of administra-
tive management of the electromagnetic broadcast spectrum.?
21. See Terrence J. Schroepfer, Fee-Based Incentives and Efficient Use of Spectrum,
44 FED. COMM. L.J. 411, 430 (1992) ("A private-enterprise system cannot function prop-
erly unless property rights are created in resources, and, when this is done, someone
wishing to use a resource has to pay the owner to obtain it." (quoting R. H. Coase, The
Federal Communications Commission, 2 J.L. & ECON. 1, 14 (1959))).
22. See Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1894); see also Matthews v. Bay Head
Improv. Ass'n, 471 A.2d 355, 361 (N.J. 1984) (stating that property held in trust for the
public is "common to all the citizens") (quoting Arnold v. Mundy, 6 NJ.L. 1, 93 (N.J.
Sup. Ct. 1821)).
23. From English common law, the public trust doctrine can be traced back to Ro-
man jurisprudence, in which "the law of nature" dictated that "the air, running water,
the sea, and consequently the shores of the sea" were "common to mankind." Matthews,
471 A.2d at 360 (quoting JUSTINIAN, INSTrrUTES 2.1.1 (T. Sanders trans., 1st Am. ed.
1876)).
24. See Shively, 152 U.S. at 14.
25. See Mathews, 471 A2d at 360-63.
26. See, eg., id. at 365-69 (holding that the owner of land below the high tide mark
must provide to the residual owners of a section of beach below the high tide mark-the
public-rights of access).
27. See Shively, 152 U.S. at 11 (holding that the lands below the high tide mark are
"incapable of ordinary and private occupation"); see also Illinois Central R. R. Co. v. Illi-
nois, 146 U.S. 387, 459-60 (1892) (holding that the public trust doctrine may restrain
ability to alienate navigable waters and submerged lands forming harbors).
28. The Communications Act of 1934 incorporated both these tenets of the public
trust doctrine. It specifically prohibited private ownership of the broadcast spectrum. See
Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-416, § 301, 48 Stat. 1064, 1081 (providing
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The electromagnetic spectrum was not always considered a
common or publicly-owned resource. The idea of public ownership
is a product of history and politics as much as of the characteris-
tics of the electromagnetic spectrum itself.29 After broadcast, or
"wireless," communication was first developed, rights to use a
particular frequency of the electromagnetic spectrum were allo-
cated through a "first-in-time" principle, as were many private
property rights under the common law.3" One who wanted to
broadcast simply appropriated a suitable frequency; one who came
later found another, unused frequency. Rights established through
the first-in-time principle were not, however, recognized and en-
forced consistently, and so many conflicts arose.31 These conflicts
were addressed not by applying or enforcing rights created
through the previous first-in-time system.32 Instead, conflicts
for the "use of such channels, but not the ownership thereof"); id. § 309(b)(1), 48 Stat.
at 1085 (stating that a station license does not give the licensee any rights beyond the
term of the license). In addition, the Act provided for public access to licensed portions
of the electromagnetic spectrum. See id. § 315, 48 Stat. at 1088.
29. See Thomas W. Hazlett, The Rationality of U.S. Regulation of the Broadcast
Spectrum, 33 J.L. & EcoN. 133 (1990), 139-147 (setting forth the "conventional" view of
the history of broadcast regulation, and then offering a different view, holding that the
drafters of the Radio Act of 1927 and the Communications Act of 1934 were aware of
the "distributional consequences"); see also Ronald H. Coase, The Federal Communica-
tions Commission, 2 J.L & EcoN. 1, 33 ("Clarity of thought is even more difficult to
achieve when we speak not of ownership of frequencies but of ownership of the ether,
the medium through which the wave travels.").
30. See Carol M. Rose, Possession as the Origin of Property, 52 U. Cn. L. REV. 73,
74-75 (1985); but see Frank S. Rowley, Problems in the Law of Radio Communication, 1
U. CIN. L. REv. 1, 27-31 (1927) (arguing that the analogy to appropriating running water
is not applicable to radio frequencies).
An example of the use of the first-in-time principle in American common law is
the well-known case of Pierson v. Post., 3 Cai. R. 175 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805) (holding that
the first to capture a wild animal on unowned land is the owner); see also Richard A.
Epstein, Possession as the Root of Title, 13 GA. L. REv. 1221, 1227-28 (1979) (arguing
that most theories of property actually rest on "first possession").
31. See R. H. Coase, supra note 29, at 2 (describing the chaotic world of wireless
radio communications prior to government regulation of radio frequencies). The circum-
stances surrounding the Titanic disaster are an example of the conflict between the Navy
and amateur broadcasters. After a telegraph station in Newfoundland had received dis-
tress signals from the Titanic, many radio operators on the East Coast began to transmit
messages. The high traffic on the electromagnetic spectrum caused interference and made
communication with the Titanic nearly impossible. See THOMAS G. KRATrENMAKER,
TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW AND POLICY 3-4 (1994).
32. See Matthew L. Spitzer, The Constitutionality of Licensing Broadcasters, 64
N.Y.U. L. REV. 990, 1046 (1989) (arguing that common law property doctrines could
have been used to adjudicate conflicts between uses of the electromagnetic spectrum for
broadcasting).
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among users of the electromagnetic broadcast spectrum were ad-
dressed by Congress' passage of the Radio Act of 1912.?' The
Act attempted to solve the problem of too many broadcasters
vying for too few frequencies by prohibiting broadcasting without
a license.34
The Radio Act of 1912 contained the seeds of the public trust
model. Although it did not explicitly rely on public ownership,35
it introduced administrative allocation of the broadcast spec-
trum,3 6 which is central to the public trust model. In addition,
provisions of the Act led to a situation in which the electromag-
netic spectrum became even more scarce, making increased gov-
ernment control desirable.37 While the Act gave the Secretary of
Commerce authority to license broadcasters, it had not given him
authority to provide for the exclusive assignment of frequencies38
or to deny a right to use the electromagnetic spectrum.39 Without
a means to exclude new broadcasters, the rapid proliferation of
commercial radio broadcasters in the 1920s created "chaos,"'  as
new broadcasters appropriated new frequencies as quickly as they
33. See Radio Act of 1912, ch. 287, 37 Stat. 302 (1912); see also KRATTENMAKER,
supra note 31, at 4 (listing key provisions of the Radio Act that would become the basis
for all future broadcast regulations); Michael C. Rau, Comment, Allocating Spectrum by
Market Forces: The FCC Ultra Vires?, 37 CATH. U. L. REV. 149, 150-51 (1987) (discuss-
ing history of radio regulation).
34. See 37 Stat. at 303.
35. See KRATMENMAKER, supra note 31, at 8 ("Although the 1912 Act had required
a license to use the air, it had been silent on the issue of ownership of the airwaves.").
But see Hazlett, supra note 29, at 135 ("The federal government was asserting ownership
of the electromagnetic resource [through the Radio Act of 1912], but in a rather peculiar
way.").
36. See Glen 0. Robinson, The Federal Communications Act: An Essay on Origins
and Regulatory Purpose, in A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE COMMUNICATIONS Acr OF
1934, at 3, 8 (Max D. Paglin ed.) (1989). The Radio Act was designed primarily to regu-
late ship-to-shore communications, and had not "set aside any particular frequencies for
the use of private broadcast stations." NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 211 (1943).
Despite this shortcoming, Herbert Hoover, as Secretary of Commerce, used the Radio
Act as a basis for allocating rights to use the electromagnetic spectrum among commer-
cial broadcasters. See id.
37. See ITHIEL DE SOLA POOL, TECHNOLOGIES OF FREEDOM 113-15 (1983).
38. See United States v. Zenith Radio Corp., 12 F.2d 614, 618 (N.D. Ill. 1926) (hold-
ing that under the Radio Act of 1912 the Secretary of Commerce has no power to pro-
mulgate regulations regarding exclusive use of the spectrum).
39. See Hoover v. Intercity Radio Co., 286 F. 1003, 1006 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (holding
that Radio Act of 1912 did not grant the Secretary of Commerce discretion to withhold
a license, even to protect against interference).
40. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 375 (1969) (stating that
the pre-1927 allocation of frequencies by the private sector resulted in chaos).
618 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 46:611
could build stations, and as existing broadcasters changed their
frequencies and hours of broadcasting without warning.41
The disorganization prompted broadcasters, with the leader-
ship of then Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover, to call for
legislation to replace the Radio Act.42 At the National Radio
Conferences, convened for that purpose, representatives of the
broadcast industry and other interested parties were adamant that
the public owned the "ether."43 The Radio Act of 1927," which
was shaped by discussions in the conferences, based the allocation
of frequency rights on public ownership of the electromagnetic
spectrum.45 The provisions of the Radio Act were then incorpo-
rated into the Communications Act of 1934.46
Public ownership was justified on scarcity grounds;47 the
drafters of the Communications Act reasoned that because the
electromagnetic spectrum was an important resource that could
not be made available to all who wanted it, it should be owned by
the public.4' Those authorized to use the public's electromagnetic
spectrum had special obligations. Their rights to use the electro-
magnetic spectrum were tied to obligations to serve the public
interest;49 broadcast licensees were to be trustees for the public.
41. See J. Roger Wollenberg, The FCC as "Arbiter of The Public Interest, Conve-
nience, and Necessity," in A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE COMMUNICATIONS ACT OF
1934, supra note 36, at 61, 66 (stating that, at one point, there were 732 licensed stations
operating on only 90 channels); see also NBC, 319 U.S. 190, 210-14 (1943) (summarizing
the history of government regulation of broadcasting).
42. See Robinson, supra note 36, at 12. Calls for legislation to replace the Radio Act
led to a total of four National Radio Conferences between 1922 and 1926. See id. at 9.
43. See Wollenberg, supra note 41, at 68 ("The ether is a public medium, and its
use must be for public benefit.") (quoting Herbert J. Hoover's speech at the Fourth
National Radio Conference in 1925).
44. Ch. 169, 44 Stat. 1162 (1927).
45. See id. § 1, 44 Stat. at 1162; see also Hazlett, supra note 29, at 136 (stating that
in 1927 "the government began to behave more like an actual owner").
46. See Wollenberg, supra note 41, at 61 ("[T]he basic provisions of [the Communi-
cations Act of 1934] were taken part and parcel from the Radio Act of 1927.").
47. See id. at 67 (concluding that the "startling notion" in Great Lakes Broadcasting
v. Federal Radio Comm'n, 3 F.R.C. ANN. REP. 32 (1929), affd in part and rev'd in part,
37 F.2d 993 (D.C. Cir.), cert dismissed 281 U.S. 706 (1930), was that the scarcity of the
airwaves meant that public, rather than private, interests were chiefly at stake); see also
NBC, 319 U.S. at 216 ("The facilities of radio are limited and therefore precious; they
cannot be left to wasteful use without detriment to the public interest.").
48. See Wollenberg, supra note 41, at 63-64.
49. See Spitzer, supra note 32, at 1008; see also Robinson, supra note 36, at 9 (stat-
ing that the development of broadcasting to the general public had introduced the notion
of public service obligations).
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Thus the scarcity of the electromagnetic spectrum justified both
the goal of broadcast regulation-a "commitment to the public
interest"s---and the means to that end-a form of public owner-
ship in which electromagnetic spectrum is essentially owned by the
government, and, through licensing, is leased or temporarily grant-
ed to broadcasters."' The concept of public ownership and service
to the public interest is manifested through regulation of the struc-
ture of the broadcast industry, through administrative allocation of
rights to use the electromagnetic spectrum for broadcast, and
through regulation of the content that may be broadcast.
A. The Public Trust Model and Broadcaster Identity
The Communications Act of 1934 borrowed from the public
trust doctrine both the prohibition of private ownership 2 and the
requirement of public access. 3 The Act was designed to achieve
comprehensive government control of broadcasting. 4 which it did
by creating a licensing scheme administered by the newly-created
Federal Communications Commission (FCC)." Although a license
from the FCC was supposed to grant only a right to broadcast,
and not a right to use the electromagnetic spectrum,5 6 the license
included by default a right to use the electromagnetic spectrum. 7
50. See Newton N. Minow, Commemorative Messages, in A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
OF THE COMMUICATIONS Acr OF 1934, supra note 36, at xv ("Without commitment to
the public interest, all government action vis-d-vis communication would be without mean-
ing.").
51. See Murray J. Rossini, Comment, The Spectrum Scarcity Doctrine A Constitu-
tional Anachronism, 39 Sw. L.J. 827, 828 (1985); Spitzer, supra note 32, at 1008.
52. See Pub. L. No. 73-416, § 301, 48 Stat. 1064, 1081 (1934).
53. See iU. at 1088; see also Spitzer, supra note 32, at 1000-1003 (describing several
public access provisions including the fairness doctrine, personal attack rules, and political
broadcasting rules).
54. See § 301, 48 Stat. at 1081 ("It is the purpose of this Act, among other things,
to maintain the control of the United States over all the channels of interstate and for-
eign radio transmission .... ").
55. See § 318, 48 Stat. at 1089 ("No person shall operate [a radio transmission appa-
ratus] except under and in accordance with an operator's license issued to him by the
Commission."). The Federal Communications Commission replaced the Federal Radio
Commission, which had been created by the Radio Act of 1927. See Wollenberg, supra
note 41, at 70.
56. See § 310(b), 48 Stat. at 1086 (treating a station license and "the frequencies
authorized to be used by the licensee" separately).
57. The right to construct and operate a broadcast station was the only means of
acquiring the right to use the portions of the electromagnetic spectrum which had been
set aside for broadcasting. See § 319(a), 48 Stat. at 1089 (stating that a permit for con-
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In reality, broadcast licenses are, in part, licenses of a portion of
the electromagnetic spectrum. Under the "public interest, conve-
nience, and necessity" standard, broadcasters were required to
operate as public trustees, using their portion of the electromag-
netic spectrum to advance the interests of the public. 8
Public ownership and the public trust model also meant grant-
ing greater control to the Federal Communications Commission.
The FCC, which determined whether particular broadcasters would
serve or were already serving the public interest, was in this way
acting as the public's representative. 9 To the FCC, serving the
public interest meant controlling who would broadcast by control-
ling the distribution of rights to use the electromagnetic spec-
trum.' The FCC granted licenses based not only on neutral crite-
ria such as price, but on five categories of more personal attrib-
utes and qualifications.6 ' These requirements made it clear that
whether a broadcaster could serve as a public trustee was a func-
tion not only of its ability to purchase the use of the resource, but
also of its legal standing with the FCC, its technical ability, its
character, and its citizenship." FCC policies dictated (and dictate)
inquiry into character issues in both initial allocations and in re-
newal proceedings.' 3
The rights granted to individual broadcasters have also been
circumscribed by limiting transferability. A broadcaster's ability to
transfer the right to use a particular frequency was implicitly limit-
ed by the personal requirements of licensing.6' In addition to
structing a broadcast station includes elements other than the frequency to be used for
broadcast).
58. See KENNETH C. CREECH, ELECTRONIC MEDIA LAW AND REGULATION 70
(1993); Henry Geller, Communications Law-A Half Century Later, 37 FED. COMM. L.J.
73 (1985).
59. See Wollenberg, supra note 41, at 61, 78.
60. See id. at 71 ("The Act also placed limits on who could hold licenses and to
whom those licenses could be transferred."); see also Jonathan W. Emord, The First
Amendment Invalidity of FCC Ownership Regulations, 38 CATH. U. L. REV. 401, 403
(1989) (criticizing the FCC's scarcity-based regime for imposing restrictions "based not
upon the nature or content of speech but upon the characteristics of the speaker").
61. See CREECH, supra note 58, at 81.
62. See 47 U.S.C. § 308(b) (1994).
63. See generally In re Policy Regarding Character Qualifications in Broadcast Li-
censing, 102 F.C.C.2d 1179 (1986) (discussing the FCC's previous policies regarding inqui-
ries into the character of licensees).
64. See id. at 1180 (stating that proposed transferees are subject to the same qualifi-
cations as are initial licensees). Ownership controls make transfer difficult because acquisi-
tion of the right is a result of status as well as of contract. See Robert C. Ellickson,
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these implicit limits, the Communications Act of 1934 expressly
required FCC approval of license transfers.' In 1962, the FCC
added to the express limits of the Act by adopting a policy stating
that it would require an administrative hearing for all proposed
transfers of licenses that had been held for less than three
years.66
The FCC exerted control over who would broadcast not only
by controlling the character of individual trustees, but also by
controlling the identity of the broadcast industry as a whole. Poli-
cies promulgated by the FCC limited the number of broadcast
outlets that a broadcaster could own,67 and also tried to regulate
the networks' influence over local stations.6"
Property in Land, 102 YALE L.J. 1315, 1378 (1993) (claiming that property becomes a
marketable commodity as groups move from relationships based on status to relationships
based more on contract).
65. See § 309(b)(2), 48 Stat. at 1085 ("Neither the license nor the right granted
thereunder shall be assigned or otherwise transferred in violation of this Act."); id.
§ 310(b), 48 Stat. at 1086:
The station license required hereby, the frequencies authorized to be used by
the licensee, and the rights therein granted shall not be transferred, assigned, or
in any manner either voluntarily or involuntarily disposed of, or indirectly by
transfer of control of any corporation holding such license, to any person, un-
less the Commission shall, after securing full information, decide that said trans-
fer is in the public interest, and shall give its consent in writing.
66. See In re Amendment of Section 73.3597 of the Commission's Rules (Applica-
tions for Voluntary Assignments or Transfers of Control), 52 Rad. Reg. 2d 1081, 1081
(1982) (proposing to change the "three year rule," which it had adopted twenty years
previously).
67. See In re Amendment of Section 73.3555 of the Commission's Rules Relating to
Multiple Ownership of AM, FM and Television Broadcast Stations, 100 F.C.C.2d 17, 18
(1984) (discussing "seven station" rule, which prohibited any person or company from
holding an interest in more than seven AM, seven FM, and seven TV stations). In addi-
tion to this prohibition, the FCC adopted a policy in 1964 that required an evidentiary
hearing on any application for the acquisition of a VHF television station in one of the
top 50 markets, if the applicant already owned or had interests in another station. See
NAACP v. FCC, 682 F.2d 993, 996, 1003-04 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (describing the FCC's Top-
Fifty policy and upholding the repeal of the policy against a challenge that the repeal
would adversely effect minority ownership of television stations).
68. In 1970, the FCC promulgated the "Prime Time Access Rule" (PTAR), which
attempted to reduce the influence of large networks by requiring stations to broadcast
more local programming; it prohibited stations within the largest fifty television markets
from using more than three hours of network programming per night of prime time.
KENNETH C. CREECH, ELEcrRoNIc MEDIA LAW AND REGULATION 167-68 (2d ed. 1996)
[hereinafter CREECH 2D ED.]. This policy was recently changed, however. See In re Re-
view of the Prime Time Access Rule, Section 73.658(k) of the Commission's Rules, 78
Rad. Reg. 2d (P&F) 1076, 1101 (1995) (repealing PTAR on the basis that it was no
longer necessary to promote independent program sources because of increasing numbers
of non-broadcast outlets).
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Control over who would broadcast was also gained by circum-
scribing other characteristics of property rights. A broadcast licens-
ee was limited in its ability to exclude others from broadcasting on
its frequency.69 In addition, rights granted under broadcast licens-
es were limited to three years.7' The duration of the right, while
modified by renewal provisions, remained limited. The FCC could
also revoke a license after it had been granted, and had discretion
over whether the term of the license was extended after the statu-
tory period.7'
In 1940, the Supreme Court clarified precisely how limited a
commercial broadcaster's rights in the electromagnetic spectrum
were. In FCC v. Sanders Brothers Radio Station," the Court un-
equivocally stated that the Communications Act of 1934 did not
grant private property rights in the electromagnetic spectrum: "The
policy of the Act is clear that no person is to have anything in the
nature of a property right as a result of the granting of a li-
cense."
73
B. The Public Trust Model and Content Regulation
The priority of public interests over private interests inherent
in the public trust model was a cornerstone not only of regulations
governing the identity of broadcasters, but also of regulations
governing content.74 In both contexts, the priority of public rights
69. See Minasian, supra note 14, at 232 (explaining that the right to exclude refers to
the right to refuse others permission to radiate energy on the owned spectrum). Under
the 1934 Act, a broadcaster's right to exclude others from using its frequency was subject
to qualifications for distress signals and for government use. One sending a distress signal
could adjust the "transmitting set" so as to "produce a maximum of radiation irrespective
of the amount of interference which may thus be caused," § 321(a), 48 Stat. at 1090; one
whose broadcast interfered with a government station had to cease transmitting for a
portion of each hour. See § 323(a), 48 Stat. at 1090.
70. See § 307(d), 48 Stat. at 1084 ("No license granted for the operation of a
broadcasting station shall be for a longer term than three years and no license so grant-
ed for any other class of station shall be for a longer term than five years . . ").
71. See § 307(d), 48 Stat. at 1084. An analogous situation in real property law shows
how state discretion limits private property rights. When property rights in land subject
to a public trust are granted, the state can later reassert title to fulfill its trust duties
without that reassertion being considered a taking. In such a situation, the private
landowner's rights in the land are rendered worthless because the state retains such a
strong interest. See Douglas L. Grant, Western Water Rights and the Public Trust Doc-
trine.. Some Realism about the Takings Issues, 27 ARiz. ST. .JU. 423, 423 (1995).
72. 309 U.S. 470 (1940).
73. Id. at 475.
74. See Fowler & Brenner, supra note 15, at 213; see also Spitzer, supra note 32, at
[Vol. 46:611
1996] RIGHTS IN THE BROADCAST SPECTRUM
over private rights rests on the scarcity of the electromagnetic
spectrum.75 Under the public trust model, broadcasters serve as
trustees of the public, rather than representatives of their own
private interests. 6 This priority of public rights was evident not
only in the Communications Act of 1934, but also in FCC rule-
making and in Supreme Court jurisprudence.
The Communications Act of 1934 contained a tension be-
tween the public interest and broadcasters' speech rights: it priori-
tized public over private interests while guaranteeing broadcasters
freedom from censorship.77 The FCC responded to .this tension
by ruling that the statutory guarantee of freedom from censorship
applied only to "speech deemed to be in the public interest."78 In
other words, conflicts between a broadcaster's right to speak and
the public's rights as an audience were to be resolved by reference
to the public's rights. As the FCC stated soon after the Communi-
cations Act of 1934 was passed, the statutory public interest stan-
dard required that the "interests of the listening public [be] para-
mount to the interests of the individual applicant."79 This policy
became an explicit part of FCC regulation in 1949, when the FCC
stated that the "basic policy of the Congress" was that radio be
1054. Some examples of content regulation in the original Communications Act of 1934
were prohibitions against lotteries and against indecent communication. See Communica-
tions Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-416, §§ 316, 326, 48 Stat. 1088, 1091, repealed by Act
of June 25, 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-772, § 21, 62 Stat. 683, 862. Nonetheless, content regu-
lations of broadcasting still exist. See Hundt, supra note 11, at 1089-90; FCC v. Pacifica
Found., 438 U.S. 726, 744 (1978).
75. See Richard E. Labunski, May it Rest in Peace: Public Interest and Public Access
in the Post-Fairness Doctrine Era, 11 HASTNGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 219, 219-20 (1989).
76. Spitzer, supra note 32, at 1008. While it may be more accurate to think of the
priority of interests rather than the priority of rights when discussing something as amor-
phous as the public at large, the rhetoric in broadcast regulation and in First Amend-
ment jurisprudence has been the rhetoric of rights, not the rhetoric of interests. See Den-
ver Area Educ. Telecom. Consortium v. FCC, 116 S. Ct 2374, 2424 (1996); see also infra
notes 92-101; PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81 (1980).
77. See Communications Act of 1934, § 326, 48 Stat. at 1091:
Nothing in this Act shall be understood or construed to give the Commission
the power of censorship over the radio communications or signals transmitted
by any radio station, and no regulation or condition shall be promulgated or
fixed by the Commission which shall interfere with the right of free speech by
means of radio communication. No person within the jurisdiction of the United
States shall utter any obscene, indecent, or profane language by means of radio
communication.
78. CREECH, supra note 58, at 56.
79. In re Young People's Ass'n for the Propagation of the Gospel, 6 F.C.C. 178, 181
(1938).
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maintained "as a medium of free speech for the general public as a
whole rather than as an outlet for the purely personal or private
interests of the licensee., 80
The priority of public rights over private rights in the context
of content regulation has allowed and entailed the imposition of
limits upon broadcasters' editorial discretion that would be uncon-
stitutional if applied to the print media.81 Limits on editorial dis-
cretion circumscribed a broadcaster's right to control use of a fre-
quency by limiting what it could offer as programming.' The
FCC further limited editorial discretion by prescribing certain
types of programming83 and by prohibiting broadcasters from
broadcasting political editorials.84 In promulgating regulations
against editorializing, the FCC reiterated that it was concerned
with free speech as it related to the public, not as it related to
broadcasters. It stated that broadcasters' discretion to
determin[e] the specific program material to be broadcast over
their stations ... must be exercised in a manner consistent with
the basic policy of the Congress that radio be maintained as a
medium of free speech for the general public as a whole rather
than as an outlet for the purely personal or private interests of
the licenseeY
These limits on rights to control use of the electromagnetic spec-
trum were derived from the public trust model, as they seek to
ensure, consistent with the ideal of public ownership, that any use
is for public, not private, benefit.
80. In re Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees, 13 F.C.C. 1246, 1257 (1949) (empha-
sis added).
81. See Rossini, supra note 51, at 827. Compare Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 386-89, 400
(holding that broadcasters may be required to grant rights of access to members of the
public under certain circumstances) with Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tomillo, 418 U.S.
241, 258 (1974) (holding that a newspaper is not required to grant a similar right of ac-
cess, and that a Florida statute which required such access was unconstitutional).
82. For example, under the Communications Act of 1934, a broadcaster could not
broadcast any information "concerning any lottery . . . or similar scheme." § 316, 48 Stat.
at 1088-89.
83. For example, broadcasters were required to schedule programs directed at chil-
dren of different age groups and to limit the total number of commercials shown during
children's programming. See Spitzer, supra note 32, at 1005. In addition, stations in cer-
tain markets were prohibited from using more than three hours of network programming
per night of prime time. See id. at 1005-06.
84. See 47 C.F.R. § 73.1930 (1995). The policy against editorializing was first enunci-
ated in In re Mayflower Broad. Corp., 8 F.C.C. 333, 340 (1940).
85. See In re Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees, 13 F.C.C. at 1257.
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In addition to limiting a broadcaster's control over the use of
the electromagnetic spectrum, limits on editorial discretion con-
strained a broadcaster's ability to exclude others from use of its
broadcasting facility. 6 For example, under the equal opportunity
doctrine, codified in the original version of the Communications
Act of 1934, if a broadcaster offered airtime to "any person who
is a legally qualified candidate for any public office," then it was
required to "afford equal opportunities to all other such candidates
for that office."' 7 Related to the equal opportunity doctrine is the
Fairness Doctrine, which is perhaps the most well-known limit on
editorial discretion. 8 The Fairness Doctrine had both statutory
and administrative components. As codified in 1959, the statute re-
quired a broadcaster to "afford reasonable opportunity for the
discussion of conflicting views on issues of public importance."'
Reporting on the Fairness Doctrine in 1974,90 the FCC made it
clear that the doctrine was based on the public trust model and
the priority of the public's First Amendment rights: "[W]e do not
believe that it would be appropriate-or even permissible-for a
government agency charged with the allocation of the channels
now available to ignore the legitimate First Amendment interests
of the general public."'" These limits on a broadcaster's ability to
86. See Andrew D. Auerbach, Mandatory Access and the Information Infrastructure, 3
COMMLAW CONSPECrUS 1, 3 (1995). Many FCC regulations "require broadcasters to
relinquish their facilities [and by implication their portion of the electromagnetic
spectrum] for use as a pulpit by others." Id. Note that while the right to exclude others
is one of the most important characteristics of private property, see Minasian, supra note
14, at 228, it is bifurcated in broadcasting: in broadcasting, the right includes both the
ability to exclude others from use of one's broadcast facilities and the ability to exclude
others from the use of one's licensed portion of the electromagnetic spectrum. See supra
note 17.
87. § 315, 48 Stat. at 1088.
88. The Fairness Doctrine is an FCC policy that was codified when Congress amend-
ed the Communications Act of 1934 in 1959. See Labunski, supra note 75, at 229-30.
89. Communications Act Amendments of 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-274, § 1, 73 Stat. 557,
557 (1959) (amending 47 U.S.C. § 315). In 1967, the FCC added two more aspects to the
Fairness Doctrine: personal attack rules and limits on political editorializing. See CREECH,
supra note 58, at 64.
90. When Congress amended section 315 of the Communications Act in 1959, it re-
quired the FCC to provide a yearly report of the Fairness Doctrine. See Pub. L. No.
86-274, § 2(b), 73 Stat. 557, 557 (1959) codified at 47 U.S.C. § 315 (1994)).
91. In re the Handling of Public Issues Under the Fairness Doctrine and the Public
Interest Standards of the Communications Act, 48 F.C.C.2d 1, 6 (1974) [hereinafter 1974
Fairness Doctrine Report].
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exclude others were a manifestation of the public trust model's
limits on private ownership.
The public trust model powerfully influenced the Supreme
Court's holding in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC. 2 In Red
Lion, the Court held that the First Amendment did not bar
broadcast radio stations from being compelled to grant a right of
access under the terms of the Fairness Doctrine.93 In analyzing
the First Amendment issue, the Court viewed broadcasters as
having vague First Amendment "interests," which had to be
weighed against the public's more compelling First Amendment
rights. To the Court, broadcasting is simply "affected by a First
Amendment interest;' 94 it is "the right of the viewers and listen-
ers, not the right of the broadcasters, which is paramount."95 Un-
der this analysis, any First Amendment rights that inhere in the
use of the electromagnetic spectrum are vested in the public.
Broadcasters hold their rights subordinate to those of the public
because they serve as public trustees:
[A]s far as the First Amendment is concerned those who are
licensed stand no better than those to whom licenses are re-
fused.... There is nothing in the First Amendment which pre-
vents the Government from requiring a licensee to share his
frequency with others and to conduct himself as a proxy or fidu-
ciary with obligations to present those views and voices.9
The access rights upheld in Red Lion were a result of the
prioritization of the public's rights over those of private parties
that is inherent in the public trust doctrine.97 This priority is also
evident in other proposals for public access to broadcast facili-
ties.98 Arguments for these proposals depend on public ownership
92. 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
93. See 395 U.S. at 386-88, 400-01.
94. Id. at 386.
95. Id. at 390 (emphasis added).
96. I at 389.
97. See Auerbach, supra note 86, at 3.
98. See, eg., Dominic Caristi, The Concept of a Right of Access to the Media: A
Workable Alternative, 22 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 103, 109-10 (1988) (suggesting that without
public access rights, broadcasters exercise excessive control over a publicly-owned re-
source); Labunski, supra note 75, at 225 (stating that broadcasters' use of a "limited
public resource" should not go unregulated because "[s]carcity . . .is not dead"); Jeffrey
A. Levinson, Note, An Informed Electorate: Requiring Broadcasters to Provide Free
Airtime to Candidates for Public Office, 72 B.U. L. REv. 143, 162 (1992) (proposing that
broadcasters be required to provide free airtime to political candidates); David Daley,
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of the electromagnetic spectrum.99 Proponents of broader public
access begin with the premise that the electromagnetic spectrum is
publicly owned, and proceed to argue that those who have been
granted rights to use the spectrum have certain fiduciary obliga-
tions to the public."0 Focusing on public ownership in the first
instance dictates that the public, as the owner of the airwaves, has
a claim to a First Amendment right in the resource.''
IH. CRITICIsMs OF THE PUBLIC TRUST MODEL
The public trust model has been heavily criticized by broad-
casters, economists, and civil libertarians. Nonetheless, it remained
the principal mode of regulation throughout the 1950s, 1960s and
most of the 1970s."° In the late 1970s, however, emphasis on
broadcasters as public trustees diminished while emphasis on
broadcasters as market participants increased."°3 Commentators
Rapoport Encourages Networks to Donate Prime Time Spots to Candidates, STATES NEwS
SERv., Apr. 18, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curaws File (discussing the
"Free TV for Straight Talk Coalition," which asked the major networks to set aside free
airtime for presidential candidates and quoting Senator Bill Bradley as saying that the
"public airwaves are a public trust... and ... companies should be called to their
civic responsibility to use the airwaves to strengthen that democracy").
99. See supra note 98. But see Jerrome A. Barron, Access to the Press: A New First
Amendment Righ4 80 HARV. L. REV. 1641, 1656 (1967) (arguing for widespread public
access to the mass media, including newspapers as well as broadcasting, on First Amend-
ment, not public ownership, grounds).
100. See In re Inquiry into Section 73.1910 of the Commission's Rules and Regula-
tions Concerning the General Fairness Doctrine Obligations of Broadcast Licensees, 102
F.C.C.2d 145, 146-47 (1985) ("[[]n light of the limited availability of broadcast frequen-
cies ... [w]e determined that the need to effectuate the right of the viewing and lis-
tening public. . . justifies restrictions on the rights of broadcasters."); Levinson, supra
note 98, at 165 ("[B]ecause broadcasters use a public resource, they have what resembles
a fiduciary obligation to listeners and viewers.").
101. This analysis is much like that under the public forum doctrine in First Amend-
meat law. See WILLIAM W. VAN ALSTYNE, FIRST AMENDMENT 151 (2d ed. 1995) ("[The
airwaves] are ... akin to a public park"); see also Spitzer, supra note 32, at 1038-41
(applying public forum analysis to broadcasting). Under the public forum doctrine, speech
that takes place in a public forum provided by the government may be regulated by the
government only according to reasonable and content-neutral time, place, and manner
restrictions. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) ("[E]ven in a
public forum the government may impose reasonable restrictions on the time, place, or
manner of protected speech.").
102. See Robinson, supra note 36, at 15-19. Deregulation of broadcasters, with a phi-
losophy often opposed to the public trust model, began as early as 1972; Chairman
Charles Ferris made it official policy under President Jimmy Carter. See CREECH, supra
note 58, at 75.
103. See CREECH, supra note 58, at 75. During the Reagan administration, under
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have criticized public ownership and administrative allocation of
rights to use the electromagnetic spectrum on the related grounds
of property-based economics and First Amendment principles. At
times, property and free speech arguments overlap, as when prop-
erty rights and First Amendment principles provide alternative
methods of attacking the same broadcast regulations."° Property
and free speech arguments also overlap when the FCC is criticized
for using structural regulations to implement content preferenc-
es.
105
A. Criticisms from Economics
Those who use economics to criticize the public trust model
emphasize the inefficiencies and skewed incentives that attend
administrative allocation of public property. 6  Of commentators
who have criticized the economics of the public property approach
to spectrum allocation,"° Ronald Coase is one of the most well-
known. In The Federal Communications Commission, Professor
Coase criticized the decision in the 1920s to control disorganization
in broadcasting through administrative allocation of licenses."' 8
He argued that it was not a lack of government control which
caused the "chaos" in spectrum usage in the 1920s. The "real
cause of the trouble was that no property rights were created in
[electromagnetic spectrum]."'"
Chairman Mark Fowler, the FCC pursued a program of "unregulation." See id.
104. For example, in Trinity Methodist Church v. Federal Radio Comm., 62 F.2d 850,
852-53 (D.C. Cir. 1932), a broadcaster challenged the FRC's denial of its license on
grounds that it was both a taking of private property under the Fifth Amendment and a
denial of free speech under the First Amendment. See id. Although the court denied
both claims, id. at 851, Trinity Methodist demonstrates that property and free speech
arguments can be alternative methods to attack regulations.
105. See Auerbach, supra note 86, at 12-13 ("Thus, the government used a structural
regulation as a vehicle to reflect its content preferences."); see also Coase, supra note 29,
at 7 (criticizing aspects of public ownership on both free speech and economic grounds).
106. See, eg., LEVIN, supra note 14, at 85 ("Few would deny that the present central-
ized nonprice spectrum system is economically inefficient or that it fails to further many
overriding national priorities. Without markets and prices for radio frequencies, it is im-
possible to tell whether spectrum has been allocated optimally among alternative users
and uses."); Minasian, supra note 14, at 222 ("It is an inflexible system that gives rise to
inefficient allocation."); Hazlett, supra note 29, at 133 (noting that administrative alloca-
tion confers "significant economic rents on private parties at substantial opportunity cost
to the fisc.").
107. See Coase, supra note 29, at 14. But see Hazlett, supra note 29, at 145.
108. See Coase, supra note 29, at 17-24.
109. Id. at 14, 25. Not everyone agrees with Coase, however. One commentator has
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Administrative allocation has been criticized for several rea-
sons. One is that allocation decisions are made without adequate
information,"0 and therefore without adequate evaluation."'
Without proper evaluation of cost, benefit, and consumer prefer-
ences, administrative allocation is "incapable of guiding the re-
source-] into its highest valued alternative.,'1 2 Lack of informa-
tion is not the only difficulty; critics say that incentives inherent in
the administrative scheme skew allocation decisions by both the
FCC and broadcasters." Broadcasters' decisions are skewed be-
cause they do not pay the real cost for their rights to use the
electromagnetic spectrum."4 Administrative allocation "raise[s]
the income of station operators above what it would have been in
competitive conditions."" In addition, because broadcasters gain
the rights to use the electromagnetic spectrum without cost, they
have no incentive to economize such use." 6 Politics have an even
more troubling effect on incentives. Unlike market allocation, in
which resources are allocated based on neutral criteria such as
price, administrative allocation leaves room for political pres-
sure.
117
According to some critics, the solution to the problems inher-
ent in administrative allocation is a property rights scheme."'
argued that the drafters did not need to create property rights; they only needed to
recognize existing property rights. See Hazlett, supra note 29, at 145 (stating that
"[p]roperty rights were no mystery in [the 1920's radio] market"). In Tribune Co. v. Oak
Leaves Broadcasting Station, 68 Cong. Rec. 216 (1926) (reprinting an Illinois Circuit
Court decision of Nov. 17, 1926), a chancellor in equity enjoined a new broadcaster from
transmitting on any wavelength closer than fifty kilocycles from existing broadcaster
WGN. Both plaintiff and defendant argued that using the spectrum, investing resources,
and building a listenership gave the broadcaster a type of property right, recognized and
enforceable in equity. Id. See also Spitzer, supra note 32, at 1046.
110. See Coase, supra note 29, at 18.
111. Minasian, supra note 14, at 221.
112. Id. at 221; see also Coase, supra note 29, at 18-19.
113. See Coase, supra note 29, at 18 (arguing that FCC adopts rules in order to sim-
plify its tasks, and that it is exposed to political pressure); POOL, supra note 37, at 139-
40 (arguing that the present system enables the state to license those whose message it
prefers and that licensees make windfall profits).
114. See LEViN, supra note 14, at 225-26; William K. Jones, Use and Regulation of
the Radio Spectrum: Report on a Conference, 1968 WASH. U. L.Q. 71, 81-83 (1968).
115. Coase, supra note 29, at 22.
116. See Jones, supra note 114, at 82-84.
117. See Coase, supra note 29, at 18; POOL, supra note 37, at 139.
118. See Coase, supra note 29, at 25-34; Jones, supra note 114, at 85-97; DAvID
KELLEY & ROGER DONWAY, LAIssEz PARLER: FREEDOM IN THE ELEcIRONIC MEDIA
8, 43 (1983); Minasian, supra note 14, at 222-23; Richard W. Stevens, Comment, Anarchy
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These critics envision a limited role for the government and the
legal system; one commentator has stated that the province of the
legal system in allocation should be to "establish that clear delimi-
tation of rights on the basis of which the transfer and recombina-
tion of rights can take place through the market.""1 9 If rights
were thus delimited, market transactions could occur.'2 Property
rights transactions would, they argue, tend to maximize the value
of production and to allow financial incentives to allocate electro-
magnetic spectrum to its most valued use.21
The property rights reforms suggested by broadcast regulation
critics have not been implemented; they have nonetheless been
influential as broadcast regulation has shifted from the public trust
model toward the private market model, with a concomitant shift
from reliance on public ownership to reliance on private property
rights.
B. Criticisms from the First Amendment
The public trust model meant not only that the FCC could
control, through administrative allocation, who was able to broad-
cast, but also that it could control the content of what was broad-
cast.'" The priority of the public's speech rights over those of
broadcasters was clear in the rhetoric of Red Lion Broadcasting
Co. v. FCC."z' Responses to the Red Lion decision have been
varied. Some commentators have reacted by embracing the
principle of public access, arguing that all members of the public
should have access to broadcast communication facilities, access
not subject to the control of a broadcast licensee."z Others have
in the Skip Zone: A Proposal for Market Allocation of High Frequency Spectrum, 41
FED. COMM. LJ. 43, 43 n.1 (listing authors who have proposed systems of property
rights).
119. Coase, supra note 29, at 25.
120. See iL at 27 ("[TIhe delimitation of rights is an essential prelude to market
transactions.").
121. See id; Minasian, supra note 14, at 221-22.
122. See supra note 74 (providing examples of content regulations to which broadcast-
ers are subject).
123. 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
124. See PoO, supra note 37, at 122 ("The dilemma of free speech on a scarce me-
dium left even ardent civil libertarians in conflict."); see also infra notes 125-26 (citing
different responses to the Red Lion decision and the problem of access).
125. See generally Barron, supra note 99 (arguing for a right of access to the press,
including broadcasters, based on First Amendment principles); Labunski, supra note 75, at
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argued the opposite: that the Supreme Court was wrong in not ex-
tending to broadcasters the same editorial discretion enjoyed by
their colleagues who use print."n
Conflicting responses to Red Lion can be understood as dis-
agreement or confusion about property rights. On the one hand,
commentators who argue for public access to the electromagnetic
spectrum premise their arguments on public ownership. They
would prefer that the rights, especially speech rights, that inhere in
the use of the electromagnetic spectrum be vested in the public.
For example, Jerrome Barron argues that the First Amendment
requires that the public have an opportunity to speak and to be
heard."V Others argue that the free market of ideas and the
public's need to make informed voting decisions require that polit-
ical candidates be given time to air their views."3
On the other hand, those who argue for increased editorial
discretion for broadcasters often premise their arguments on pri-
vate ownership rights. They argue that the rights, including speech
rights, that inhere in the use of the electromagnetic spectrum
should be vested in broadcasters rather than the public at
large. 9 These commentators also criticize the current system of
broadcast regulation as inconsistent with the First Amendment.
Some of these commentators argue that government ownership of
277-78 (listing proposals for access to broadcast facilities); Levinson, supra note 98 (ar-
guing that broadcasters should be required to provide free airtime to political candidates);
Daley, supra note 98 ("The world's greatest democratic government has lent the right to
the airwaves to certain companies, and those companies should be called to their civic
responsibility to use the airwaves to strengthen that democracy." (quoting then U.S. Sena-
tor Bill Bradley)).
126. See Spitzer, supra note 32 (arguing that the licensing regime is inconsistent with
the First Amendment because of the limits it places on broadcasters' editorial discretion);
Fowler & Brenner, supra note 15 (arguing that it makes no sense for the First Amend-
ment rights of the public to have priority over those of the speakers, the broadcasters).
127. See Barron, supra note 99, at 1666-78.
128. See PooL, supra note 37, at 121; Levinson, supra note 98, at 164-65; Daley,
supra note 98; see also Nevel, supra note 13, at D-1 (describing a bipartisan group's
request that influential broadcasters offer free airtime to political candidates).
129. See generally, KELLEY & DONWAY, supra note 118, at 43 (arguing that "only a
free market in communications media, services, and products, based on the recognition of
property rights, can accommodate and preserve the different dimensions of freedom: eco-
nomic, intellectual, and political"); Rossini, supra note 51, at 838-39 (discussing property
proposal as a solution to criticisms based on the scarcity rationale).
130. See KELLEY & DONWAY, supra note 118, at 27-33 (criticizing public rights of
access); PooL, supra note 137, at 139 (criticizing the broadcast licensing system for creat-
ing censorship).
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a resource necessary to the public's communication is the essential
problem,' and that the power to license inherently involves cen-
sorship."2 As one such critic said: "So long as the [Commission]
can determine which individuals shall be endowed with larynxes it
does not need additional power to determine what shall be
said."133
Critics who argue for increased editorial discretion also point
to the incongruence between First Amendment jurisprudence as it
is applied to broadcast and print journalists." Unlike publishers
of print, broadcasters must be licensed by the government,135
with resulting restrictions that range from limits on excluding views
contrary to their own 36 to prohibitions on the use of "indecent"
language. 37 One of the most influential critics in this area has
been Ithiel de Sola Pool.'38 Pool notes that in the days leading
up to the Radio Act of 1927, there was consensus between radio
station operators and the government on the need for regula-
tion, ' 39 and on the undesirability of censorship."4 Nonetheless,
broadcasters have not enjoyed the same freedom as have other
journalists, and Pool has observed that "[ilt is hard to reconcile
131. See Spitzer, supra note 32, at 1042 (arguing that the First Amendment requires
private ownership of communication resources.)
132. See POOL, supra note 37, at 122 (referring to the Radio Act of 1927); Spitzer,
supra note 32, at 1060 ("[I]t would be safer for First Amendment values if the govern-
ment sold all the spectrum and then bought whatever it needed in the market."). Even
in 1927, Radio Commissioner Henry Bellows commented that "[t]he physical facts of
radio transmission compel what is, in effect, a censorship of the most extraordinary
kind." POOL, supra note 37, at 123 (quoting FEDERAL RADIO COMMISSION, ANNUAL RE-
PORT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1927, at 6 (1927)).
133. Id. at 122 (quoting Morris Ernst).
134. Critics point to the divergence between the Supreme Court's approach in Miami
Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 257-58 (1974), in which the Supreme
Court struck down a right of reply statute as it applied to newspapers, and its approach
in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 400-01 (1969), in which the Su-
preme Court upheld a right of reply statute as part of the fairness doctrine. See Spitzer,
supra note 32, at 994-1006 (listing restrictions on broadcasting as distinguished from print
media).
135. See 47 U.S.C. § 307 (1994).
136. See 47 U.S.C. § 315 (1994); Auerbach, supra note 86, at 3 (calling it the "equal
opportunities rule").
137. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748-51 (1978) (upholding an adminis-
trative ban on indecent language in broadcasting during certain hours).
138. See Hazlett, supra note 29, at 133.
139. See POOL, supra note 37, at 116-18.
140. See id. at 116-17.
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such governmentally imposed requirements with the traditional
concept of the freedom of the press."''"
Mark Fowler, former Chairman of the FCC, and David
Brenner have criticized what they see as the subordination of a
broadcaster's editorial discretion to the "perceived needs of the
general public for access to expression over the airwaves"'42 on
two grounds. First, they argue that First Amendment rights should
vest in an active speaker (the broadcaster), rather than with the
passive receiver (the listening public). 43 Second, they argue that
subordinating editorial discretion, and thus a broadcaster's First
Amendment rights, to the public's needs potentially "prove[s] too
much."'" If a listener's First Amendment rights are superior to a
broadcaster's First Amendment rights, then "the rights of newspa-
per readers should be paramount to the rights of the publishers
and editors and the rights of movie patrons superior to those of
exhibitors."'4
Many critics of First Amendment doctrine in broadcasting
have advocated a solution grounded in private property rights.'
They have argued that shifting property rights in the electromag-
netic spectrum away from the public or government and toward
broadcasters would solve the inconsistencies or incompatibility
between free speech principles and regulation based on licens-
ing. 47 One commentator has argued that market allocation is su-
perior to administrative allocation because state licensing inevitably
means state censorship.' Another has stated: "Censorship can
be, and is brought about by limiting the rights of private proper-
ty.1
49
The reforms suggested by these critics of public ownership and
administrative allocation have not been implemented, or at least
have not been implemented in their entirety. The FCC still decides
which portions of the electromagnetic spectrum will be used for
141. Id. at 135.
142. Fowler & Brenner, supra note 15, at 237.
143. Id. at 237-38.
144. Id. at 238.
145. Id.
146. See KELLEY & DONWAY, supra note 118, at 43; Bruce M. Owen, Radio and
Television, in FREE BUT REGULATED: CONFLICrING TRADITIONS IN MEDIA LAW 35, 39
(Daniel L. Brenner & William L. Rivers eds., 1982); Spitzer, supra note 32, at 1068.
147. See Owen, supra note 146, at 39.
148. See POOL, supra note 37, at 139.
149. Minasian, supra note 14, at 268.
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broadcasting and which will be used for other purposes. The pres-
ent permutation of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended
by the Telecommunications Act of 1996, continues to forbid users
of electromagnetic spectrum from acquiring a property right in
electromagnetic spectrum or in a broadcast license.5 Broadcast-
ers continue to be subject to restrictions on the content they
broadcast."' Nonetheless, these criticisms of administrative allo-
cation have influenced the shift from the public trust model to the
private market model, and from public to private property rights
in the broadcast spectrum.'
III. TOWARD THE PRIVATE MARKET MODEL
Despite the statutory ban on private ownership of the electro-
magnetic spectrum, broadcasters are no longer treated as trustees
of public property. Instead, spectrum users and the FCC operate
as if spectrum licensees are private parties with interests in a valu-
able, scarce resource. 3 Although broadcast regulation was origi-
nally premised on public ownership of the electromagnetic spec-
trum, private parties now have stronger, more secure rights in the
spectrum. The shift from a public trust model to a private market
model, and the resulting shift from public ownership to private
property rights, has occurred in three contexts: administrative
practices of the FCC, legislative changes by the FCC and Con-
gress, and free speech doctrine under the First Amendment. As a
result of this shift, broadcasters' rights to use the spectrum have
been strengthened and now more closely resemble private property
rights. Specifically, broadcasters enjoy increased rights to control
the use of their portion of the spectrum, to exclude use by others,
and to exercise discretion in acquisition and transfer. In addition,
150. See Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 336(d), 110 Stat. 56,
108 (1996). But see supra notes 3-7 and accompanying text (arguing that the Telecommu-
nications Act of 1996 treats current licenses as exchangeable rights that function like
private property rights).
151. See, e.g., FCC v. Pacifica Found., 439 U.S. 726.
152. See In re Cowles Florida Broad., Inc. 60 F.C.C.2d 372, 445 (1976) (Robinson,
Comm'r, dissenting) (citing Professor Coase and arguing that broadcast licenses should be
auctioned and recognized as private property rights).
153. See infra notes 175-85 and accompanying text; see also Michael J. Hirrel, Oil and
Vinegar: The FCC and the D.C. Circui4 3 CoMMLAw CONSPECTUS 121, 124 (1995) (stat-
ing that the way the FCC is viewed has changed from balancing private interests solely
against the public interest to acting as "an arbiter of competing private interests").
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these rights are made more secure because they can be held for
an extended duration.
A. Expansion of Private Property Rights Through the Reliance
Interest
The shift toward the private market model has been, in part,
a result of the tendency of broadcast licensees and the FCC to
maintain the status quo. Paradoxically, however, maintenance of
the status quo has changed the way both the FCC and broadcast-
ers think about the rights granted by a license; it also has changed
the way that rights to use the electromagnetic spectrum are ac-
quired and transferred." Behind the facade of the Communica-
tions Act of 1934, actions by both private broadcasters and the
FCC have strengthened broadcasters' rights in spectrum and have
helped to create an informal, or shadow, market for spectrum as a
transferable resource. 5 ' Thus, broadcasters now more closely re-
semble competing players in a market than they do public trustees.
1. Renewal Expectancy. The tendency to maintain the status
quo can be explained by the "reliance interest."'56 As Professor
Joseph Singer has said, "[n]on-owners who have relied on a
relationship with the owner that made . . . access [to a resource]
possible in the past may be granted partial or total immunity from
having such access revoked when this is necessary to achieve
justice."'57 Reliance interests create property rights through
judicial recognition that an ongoing relationship has rendered a
party vulnerable to injurious changes.5 8 In broadcasting, the
relationship between broadcasters and their regulators (Congress
and now the FCC) dates back to the process leading up to the
154. See LEVIN, supra note 14, at 113.
155. See infra notes 175-85 and accompanying text.
156. See Singer, supra note 20, at 619-20 (discussing case in which plaintiffs argued
that a property right "has arisen from the long-established relationship" between the par-
ties). An administrative law case, Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto, 467 U.S. 986 (1984), provides
an example of a reliance interest at work. In Ruckelshaus, the Supreme Court deter-
mined that whether a right should be considered a property right for the purpose of due
process depended in part on whether the holder of the right could demonstrate .that it
had "reasonable, investment-backed expectations" in the property. Id. at 1005.
157. Singer, supra note 20, at 699.
158. See id. at 621.
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Radio Act of 1927.151 Whether the vulnerability created by this
relationship must be recognized in order to avoid injustice is an
open question. Nonetheless, the relationship between broadcasters
and their regulators seems in fact to have created an implicit
guarantee that broadcasters' licenses will not easily be revoked by
the government. 16
This reliance interest is evident in the FCC policy of granting
a "renewal expectancy" to incumbent licensees in comparative
hearings. 6' Comparative hearings arise when there are two mu-
tually exclusive applications for the same license.' 62 Rather than
automatically renewing the incumbent's broadcast license, the FCC
arranges to hold a hearing in which it determines which of the two
or more applicants is best able to serve the public interest.' 16 To
make this determination, the FCC examines many factors, such as
service to the community, previous compliance with FCC content
regulations, and the concentration of media in that particular
area." Granting a renewal expectancy means that in a compara-
tive hearing, an incumbent broadcaster has an advantage over a
challenger, provided that the incumbent's past performance does
not contain "serious deficiencies."' ' Although the FCC's state-
ment of this policy was struck down as a denial of administrative
due process,"6 the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
159. See KRATrENMAKER, supra note 31, at 5-7; Hazlett, supra note 29, at 153-54.
160. See Telecommunications Act of 1996, § 204(a)(4), Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat.
113 (1996) (amending 47 U.S.C. § 309) (prohibiting consideration of a competitor in a
proceeding to renew a broadcaster's license).
161. See CREEcH 2D ED., supra note 68, at 124-27.
162. See Spitzer, supra note 32, at 997-98.
163. See CREECH 2D ED., supra note 68, at 124.
164. Policy Statement Concerning Comparative Hearings Involving Regular Renewal
Applicants, 22 F.C.C.2d 424, 424-27 (1970) [hereinafter Comparative Hearing Policy State-
ment].
165. See id. at 428. It is unclear what "serious deficiencies" are, since the FCC rarely
refuses to renew a license. See CREECH 2D ED., supra note 68, at 124-25.
The FCC's policy of giving preference to an incumbent over a new applicant in a
comparative renewal hearing was stated in a 1951 case, In re Hearst Radio Inc.
(WBAL), 15 F.C.C. 1149 (1951). The policy did not provide the degree of protection that
broadcasters would have liked for their investments, and so the broadcast lobby attempt-
ed to convince Congress to amend the Communications Act. After an amendment to the
Communications Act making renewal expectancy both strong and automatic failed to pass
Congress, the FCC adopted a Policy Statement to the same effect in 1970. See CREECH
2D ED., supra note 68, at 126.
166. See Citizens Communications Ctr. v. FCC, 447 F.2d 1201, 1205-06 (D.C. Cir.
1971) (holding that policy statement violates Ashbacker doctrine, which requires a full
hearing when mutually exclusive applications are filed).
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Circuit held that superior performance by an incumbent could still
be regarded as a "plus of major significance."'67 Thus, while the
FCC may not raise renewal expectancy to an "irrebuttable pre-
sumption in favor of the incumbent,"' ' "some degree of renewal
expectancy is permissible."'69
Whatever the precise doctrinal formulation of the renewal
expectancy, in practice broadcast licenses are routinely re-
newed.' Current FCC Chairman Reed Hundt has stated that in
renewal proceedings for broadcast television licenses, the FCC has
renewed "almost every single broadcast license at least three times,
and has taken away not one license for failure to provide public
interest programming."'' Routine renewal with seemingly little
scrutiny arises in part because both the grantor (the FCC) and the
grantee (the broadcaster) have a strong incentive to rely on the
current allocation of rights. As former Chairman Fowler has said,
"Both the license renewal rate and the profits for most of the
broadcasting business have been so high that neither the regulated
nor the regulators have been anxious to challenge the system.' 7 2
Renewal expectancy strengthens a broadcaster's right in the
electromagnetic spectrum by extending the duration of the right.
In the 1990s, an incumbent licensee who has been granted a re-
newal expectancy is insulated from challenges by competitors who
seek access to the portion of the spectrum to which the incumbent
currently has rights. 3 Although this expansion of a property
167. Citizens Communications Ctr., 447 F.2d at 1213.
168. Central Florida Enters., Inc. v. FCC, 683 F.2d 503, 506 (D.C. Cir. 1982). In 1989
the FCC issued a proposed rule designed to clarify its policy. The proposed rule provid-
ed for a rebuttable presumption that the incumbent licensee had provided meritorious
service. See CREECH 2D ED., supra note 68, at 127; see also In re Formulation of Policies
and Rules Relating to Broadcast Renewal Applicants, Competing Applicants, and Other
Participants to the Comparative Renewal Process and to the Prevention of Abuses of the
Renewal Process, 4 F.C.C.R. 7851, 7851 (1989) (stating that the FCC would continue to
award renewal expectancy based upon the incumbent's past meritorious service and call-
ing for a new order of proof to apply such a standard).
169. Central Florida Enters., Inc., 683 F.2d at 506.
170. See CREECH 2D ED., supra note 68, at 126.
171. Hundt, supra note 11, at 1094. Renewal proceedings, which previously took place
every three years, have taken place every five years since the late 1970s. Id. With the
passage of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, radio and television broadcast licenses
will be renewed every eight years. See Telecommunications Act of 1996, § 203, Pub. L.
No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 112 (1996) (amending 47 U.S.C. § 307(c)).
172. Fowler & Brenner, supra note 15, at 209.
173. This advantage promises to be even greater under the provisions of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996. See § 204(a)(4), 110 Stat. at 113 (amending 47 U.S.C.
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right has been cast in the language of the public interest and the
public trust model,74 it is in reality part of the shift toward the
private market model. When government and the public have less
of a residual right in the license, the coinciding right in the licens-
ee is stronger.
2. Shadow Markets for Spectrum. Under the Communications
Act of 1934, licenses to operate broadcast facilities-and thus
rights to use the electromagnetic spectrum-may not be transferred
without FCC approval.75 When a transfer is granted, it is to
include the transfer of only the station and its organization, since
the "frequency is public property, and the grant of a license gives
no rights of any sort in that frequency."' 7 6 However, these
statutory limits have failed to keep a market in electromagnetic
spectrum from developing, in part because FCC policies have im-
plicitly accepted and even encouraged such a market." The
market for electromagnetic spectrum is a shadow market; rights to
use the electromagnetic spectrum are transferred in the form of a
transfer of broadcasting equipment.'
The creation of a market in electromagnetic spectrum, in
contravention of the stated goals of the Communications Act of
1934, is encouraged, first, by the tension embodied in the Act it-
self. Allocation decisions under the Communications Act of 1934
are inherently unstable; "[t]he initial method of selecting a license
may have little effect on who ultimately holds it."' 9 Although
the FCC, as grantor of rights to use the electromagnetic spectrum,
§ 309) (granting increased license terms and prohibitions on considerations of competi-
tors).
174. See, e.g., Comparative Hearing Policy Statement, supra note 164, at 428-29 (using
public trust language to justify a policy of routine renewal of broadcasting licenses).
175. See Communications Act of 1934, § 301, Pub. L. No. 73-416, 48 Stat. 1064, 1081
(1934) (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 301 (1994)) ("It is the purpose of this chapter, among
other things, to maintain the control of the United States over all the channels of radio
transmission . . . and no ... license shall be construed to create any right, beyond the
terms, conditions, and periods of the license.").
176. Coase, supra note 29, at 22.
177. See infra note 184 and accompanying text (in practice, FCC routinely grants
transfers); see also supra text accompanying notes 154-74 (explaining how broadcasters
have developed a reliance interest in the electromagnetic spectrum with the encourage-
ment of FCC policy).
178. See POOL, supra note 37, at 139.
179. Kwerel & Felker, Using Auctions to Select FCC Licensees, in KRATENMAKER,
supra note 31, at 121, 123 (1994).
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bases allocation decisions on broadcasters' ability to serve as pub-
lic trustees, broadcasters are not always motivated by fiduciary
considerations. They expect not only to serve as public trustees,
but also, primarily, to make a profit."8° Having received an eco-
nomically valuable right for free,' broadcasters can profit from
that windfall"m in one of two ways. They can operate radio or
TV stations, making a profit by selling time to advertisers; or they
can sell the rights to operate those stations-which implicitly in-
clude the rights to use those portions of the electromagnetic spec-
trum-for more than the amount they had paid. The Communica-
tions Act of 1934 sought to prevent the latter by making transfers,
like initial allocations, administrative rather than market deci-
sions." Over time, however, the administrative component of
transfers became less important; transfers are now nearly always
approved.'84 Over time, it also became clear that prices paid by
buyers were not simply for broadcasting equipment; "a great part
of the purchase price is in fact payment for obtaining the use of
the frequency."'" The creation of a shadow market made clear
that the electromagnetic spectrum was a resource that could be
acquired and transferred through market mechanisms.
B. Deregulation
Deregulatory actions by the FCC and Congress have also
increased the scope and the strength of private property rights in
the electromagnetic spectrum. As discussed in Part II, the Commu-
nications Act of 1934 placed several limitations on use and control
180. See CBS v. Democratic Nat. Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 187 (1973) (Brennan, J., dis-
senting). ("[I]n light of the strong interest of broadcasters in maximizing their audience,
and therefore their profits, it seems almost naive to expect [them] to . . . reflect a full
spectrum of viewpoints."); James T. Hamilton, Comment: Private Interests in 'Public
Interest' Programming: An Economic Assessment of Broadcaster Incentives, 45 DuKE L.J.
1177, 1183 ("[B]roadcasters will choose to air programs that maximize . . . profits.").
181. See LEViN, supra note 14, at 85 (describing how the FCC "give[s] away" broad-
cast licenses).
182. Harvey Levin investigated the value of essentially "free" spectrum in the 1940s
and 1950s. See id. By comparing earning rates in broadcasting with those in comparable
"creative" industries like newspapers and magazines, he found that broadcasting profit
margins (at least in AM radio and VHF television) were far in excess of corporations in
other sectors. See id. at 367-68.
183. See supra notes 64-66 and accompanying text.
184. See POOL, supra note 37, at 139.
185. Coase, supra note 29, at 22.
1996]
640 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 46:611
of a licensed portion of the spectrum.'86 Deregulation, with its
goals of increased competition and decisionmaking based on mar-
ket criteria,'" forced a recognition of broadcasters' roles as mar-
ketplace competitors, as well as public trustees.18
One way to recognize broadcasters as entities competing in a
market was to make allocation of rights to use the electromagnetic
spectrum depend on market factors rather than administrative
decisions. Administrative allocation based on the public interest
standard was difficult to apply and drew criticism as being irratio-
nal, inefficient, and at odds with fundamental liberties. 89 The
first move toward market allocation of electromagnetic spectrum
came in 1981, when Congress gave the Commission permissive
authority "to award licenses by random selection."' 90 Thus, lot-
teries had the effect of making licenses less like government-sanc-
tioned privileges and more like resources that could be traded in a
market.'9'
Market-based allocation via auctions was suggested in 1985"
and adopted in 1993.' Although auctions were only used to al-
186. Some of the most significant are: 1) The right to exclude others, including the
government and those desiring "equal time," was limited; 2) spectrum was allocated
based on government judgments-about matters such as a prospective broadcaster's char-
acter and alienage-rather than on price, which in turn limited transferability; 3) licensees
had little ability to control use of their licensed portion of the electromagnetic spectrum;
4) the right was of short duration and had little immunity from government expropria-
tion. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
187. See Henry Geller, Foreword to THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS DEREGULATION
SOURCEBOOK at viii (Stuart N. Brotman ed., 1987).
188. See Fowler & Brenner, supra note 15, at 210 ("[T]he first step in a marketplace
approach to broadcast regulation, then, is to focus on broadcasters not as fiduciaries of
the public, as their regulators have historically perceived them, but as marketplace com-
petitors.").
189. See generally supra Part II (detailing criticisms of administrative allocation of the
electromagnetic spectrum).
190. Ervin S. Duggan, Spectrum Licensing in the '90s: Can We Find A Way?, Remarks
before the American Mobile Telecommunications Association SMR Leadership Confer-
ence (June 24, 1992), available in 1992 FCC Lexis 3479, at *8. Several problems with the
lottery system arose, the most significant of which was that because rights were given
away essentially for free, there were many more applications for licenses than there were
licenses available. See id.
191. See generally Ellickson, supra note 64, at 1377-78 (arguing that property becomes
a marketable commodity as groups move from relationships based on status to relation-
ships based more on contract).
192. In 1985, then-Chairman Fowler proposed to Congress that "spectrum be assigned
through competitive bidding without regard to use." Duggan, supra note 190, at *10.
193. See J. Gregory Sidak, Telecommunications in Jericho, 81 CAL L. REV. 1209, 1234
(1993).
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locate portions of spectrum not used for broadcasting,94 the use
of auctions indicates a shift in FCC philosophy that is now work-
ing its way into broadcasting; recently, it was proposed that the
spectrum for a new technology-high definition television, or
HDTV-be auctioned. 95 Allocating rights to use part of the
electromagnetic spectrum based on price demonstrates that the
electromagnetic spectrum as a whole, although it has long been
considered to be owned by the public, is not immune from being
sold to private bidders. Once acquired by private bidders, the right
is more akin to a property right, or a commodity traded in a mar-
ket, than to a government-sanctioned privilege. Using price as a
means of allocating rights is further evidence of the shift toward a
private market model, since price allocation recognizes spectrum
users as competing private actors who function in a system that
looks like a private enterprise system, rather than as public trust-
ees.
196
Changes in the way broadcasters acquire rights in the electro-
magnetic spectrum also affect transferability, again strengthening
those rights. Since market factors are more neutral bases for allo-
cation decisions,"9 they allow for more potential buyers and
more potential uses. FCC policies also have enabled more transfers
to occur. Between 1962 and 1982, broadcasters were subject to the
"antitrafficking rules," which limited transferability in an attempt
to control speculation in licenses. The antitrafficking rules re-
194. See id. Auctions first applied only to spectrum for Personal Communications
Services (PCS). See id. Later, they also were used to allocate spectrum for Multipoint
and/or Multichannel Distribution Service (MDS). See In re Amendment of Parts 21 and
74 of the Commission's Rules With Regard to Filing Procedures in the Multipoint Distri-
bution Service and in the Instructional Television Fixed Service and Implementation of
Section 309(j) of the Communications Act--Competitive Bidding, Report and Order, 10
F.C.C. Reg. 9589 (1995); Interactive Video Data Services (IVDS), and Direct Broadcast
Satellite (DBS). See S. Jenell Trigg, The Federal Communications Commission's Equal
Opportunity Employment Program and the Effect of Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,
4 CoMMLAv CONsPEcrus 237, 241 (1996) (listing the services for which spectrum has
been auctioned by the FCC).
195. In the spring of 1996, Bob Dole, then Senate majority leader, proposed that
licenses for high-definition television (HDTV) be auctioned, rather than granted through
administrative allocation. See Clay Chandler, In the Dole Tax Plan, Questions of Credibili-
ty, WASH. POST, Aug. 21, 1996, at Fl.
196. See Coase, supra note 29, at 14 ("[A] private-enterprise system cannot function
properly unless property rights are created in resources, and, when this is done, someone
wishing to use a resource has to pay the owner to obtain it.").
197. See POOL, supra note 37, at 139 (criticizing administrative allocation for its lack
of neutrality among competing viewpoints).
198. See In re Amendment of Section 73.3597 of the Commission's Rules (Applica-
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quired that if a licensee wanted to transfer a license it had held
for less than three years, not only did the FCC have to approve
the transfer, but it had to set the application for a hearing.199 Al-
though the FCC rules did permit transfers,I the hearing require-
ment reduced the extent to which a license "looked like" trans-
ferable property. After deregulation became a force in the late
1970s and the early 1980s, the FCC relaxed the antitrafficking
rules in 1982,20' decreasing the time requirement for retention of
a license, and making it easier for spectrum to be transferred
to those who would value it more highly. In the process of relax-
ing its antitrafficking standards, the FCC also strengthened broad-
casters' private property interests in spectrum.
For broadcasters, deregulation also meant increased rights to
control their use of the electromagnetic spectrum. Increased con-
trol involves both increased editorial discretion, in the form of
autonomy in format and programming decisions,' and an in-
crease in choices regarding the use to which a portion of the elec-
tromagnetic spectrum would be put. Motivated by a desire to
deregulate the broadcast industry, the FCC stated that it would no
longer mandate certain types of radio programming that would
serve the public interest and would no longer review format
changes (i.e., whether a radio station played classical or popular
music).' The U.S. Supreme Court upheld the FCC's authority
to make this change in FCC v. WNCN Listeners Guild.' In
WNCN, the Court stated that market forces and competition,
rather than administrative rules, were best able to serve the public
interest in diverse programming.2D
Also as a result of deregulatory initiatives, broadcasters now
have increased control over how to use their portion of the elec-
tions for Voluntary Assignments or Transfers of Control), 52 Rad. Reg. 2d (P&F) at
1082.
199. See id.
200. See id. at 1082.
201. See 52 Rad. Reg. 2d (P&F) at 1086-87.
202. 1i. at 1087-88.
203. See In re Deregulation of Radio, 84 F.C.C.2d 968, 977-83 (1981) (eliminating
many guidelines for radio broadcasters, including minimal amounts of non-commercial
programming); FCC v. WNCN Listeners Guild, 450 U.S. 582, 593 (1981) (upholding an
FCC policy of no longer considering format changes as an adverse factor in license re-
newals and transfers).
204. See In re Deregulation of Radio, 84 F.C.C.2d at 968.
205. 450 U.S. 582 (1981).
206. See id at 603.
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tromagnetic spectrum.' While the FCC still designates which
portions of the electromagnetic spectrum should be used for which
purposes,' the trend brought about by deregulation is to allow
licensees greater freedom in choosing how to use their allotted
portion of spectrum. For example, the FCC allows broadcasters of
AM and FM radio to use their signals for other uses, such as
teletext transmission, which will not interfere with "broadcast chan-
nel operation."' These sorts of arrangements use mechanisms
which rely on competing private users-a marketplace approach-
rather than a standard which relies on a determination about
which technology is best placed in which portion of the spectrum.
Deregulatory initiatives have also strengthened private proper-
ty rights in the electromagnetic spectrum by increasing their dura-
tion. Originally, the license term for radio and television was three
years.210 In 1981, however, the guaranteed term of the license
was extended to seven years for radio and five for television.211
Now, after the passage of the Telecommunications Act of 1996,
broadcast licenses are granted for a term of eight years.2 2 Cou-
pled with the renewal expectancy,"- a longer term provides a
broadcast licensee with substantial certainty that it will continue to
enjoy the use of the resource, while at the same time preserving
much smaller residual rights for the grantors-the public.
A statement by former Commissioner Ervin S. Duggan dem-
onstrates how even within discussions of public ownership, the
public or government has a much smaller residual right in a
207. See Douglas Webbink, Radio Licenses and Frequency Spectrum Use Property
Rights in KRATrENMAiCER, supra note 31, at 55, 56; In re Amendment of Parts 2 and 73
of the Commission's Rules Concerning Use of Subsidiary Communications Authorizations,
97 F.C.C.2d 23, 25 (1984) [hereinafter FM Subsidiary Authorization]; In re Amendment
of Parts 2 and 73 of the Commission's AM Broadcast Rules Concerning the Use of the
AM Carrier, 100 F.C.C.2d 5 (1984) [hereinafter AM Subsidiary Authorization].
208. See Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 301 (1994).
209. See AM Subsidiary Authorization, supra note 207, at 5; FM Subsidiary Authoriza-
tion, supra note 207, at 1519 (FM stations may allow their signal-or their portion of the
electromagnetic spectrum-to be used for other, noninterfering uses).
210. See CREECH, supra note 58, at 94.
211. See id.
212. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 203, 110 Stat. 56, 112.
(amending 47 U.S.C. § 307(c)(1) to provide that the term of a license for operating a
broadcast station shall not exceed eight years).
213. See CREECH, supra note 66, at 98 (noting that the policy of renewal expectancy
gives the incumbent an advantage over the challenger in a comparative hearing); see also
supra note 161 and accompanying text.
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broadcast license. In advocating auctions of broadcast spectrum,
Duggan has said that the use of the spectrum should generate
money "for the American people to whom the spectrum be-
longs,"214 and that he had "reservations about.., the 'property
psychology,' in which licensees might come to see themselves as
permanent owners, having 'bought and paid for' their spec-
trum." '215 To preserve the ideal of public ownership, even within
an allocation scheme that assumes private market participants,
Commissioner Duggan suggested that policy be based upon the
following analogy: "As a legal matter, FCC licenses, even those
awarded by auction, must never be viewed as outright sales; they
are more akin to contracts or leases that revert automatically to
the public domain if the terms are broken." '216 However, by using
the language of reverter, Commissioner Duggan tacitly admits that
broadcasters enjoy much stronger property rights in the electro-
magnetic spectrum than they would if they were trustees of the
public.2 17
C. Changes in Content Regulation and First Amendment Doctrine
Changes in content regulation and free speech doctrine under
the First Amendment as it applies to broadcasting have paralleled
changes in other areas of broadcast regulation. These changes
either have strengthened private property rights or have reflected
already-enhanced private property rights. As broadcasters have
been granted increased editorial discretion, they have been more
able to control content and to control that portion of the spectrum
which they have been licensed.1 ' Under the public trust model,
limits on editorial discretion were justified on grounds that the
public owned the electromagnetic spectrum.219 A shift away from
the public ownership rationale, along with changes in the focus of
First Amendment rights, has shifted broadcast content regulation
toward the private market model.
214. See Duggan, supra note 190, at *11.
215. Id. at *13.
216. Id. at *16.
217. The language of reverter implies that the public is the holder of a reversionary
interest, rather than the beneficiary of a trust.
218. See supra notes 81-85 and accompanying text (noting that lack of editorial discre-
tion decreases private property rights).
219. See supra notes 81-101 and accompanying text.
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The high point of the priority of public over private rights in
the electromagnetic spectrum was the Supreme Court decision in
Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC.' Soon after the Red Lion
decision, however, the relative priority of public and private rights
began to shift. In the first major First Amendment decision involv-
ing broadcasting after Red Lion, CBS v. Democratic National
Committee,"9 the Supreme Court limited the scope of Red Lion
by holding that a broadcaster's policy of not selling advertising
time to individuals or groups did not violate the First Amendment
or the Communications Act.' In doing so, it questioned the no-
tion that public ownership means public access.' The Court also
adjusted the relative priorities of First Amendment rights that had
been set forth in Red Lion and demonstrated a different percep-
tion of broadcasters than it previously had. No longer were the
public's First Amendment rights either "paramount" to those of
broadcasters or implicitly the center of First Amendment analysis.
This is evident in the Court's analysis, which focuses primarily on
the First Amendment rights of broadcasters, rather than those of
the public. Although the Court's opinion invokes the rationales of
scarcity and the public trustee function, 4 it only briefly men-
tions the public interest and then proceeds to focus on the First
Amendment rights of broadcasters.' Indeed, the Court's shift in
priorities is apparent in its characterization of the public's claim as
an "interest" rather than a more significant "right."'
According to the Court, the importance of the "journalistic
discretion of broadcasters" dictated that broadcasters be enabled to
make decisions about the content they broadcast.' "For better
or worse," the Court stated, "editing is what editors are for; and
editing is selection and choice of material."' CBS strengthened
broadcasters' editorial discretion, increasing their ability to control
220. Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969); see supra notes 92-97 and
accompanying text for a description of the Red Lion doctrine.
221. 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
222. See id. at 129-31.
223. See id. at 105-06.
224. See id. at 101 (noting the "inherent physical limitation" caused by the scarcity of
available electromagnetic spectrum); id. at 111, 118 (discussing the "public trustee" func-
tion of a broadcast licensee).
225. See id. at 120-22.
226. See supra note 76.
227. Id. at 124.
228. Id.
1996]
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
their licensed portion of the electromagnetic spectrum. By focusing
on broadcasters' First Amendment rights, the Court also demon-
strated a new perception of broadcasters; it treated them as play-
ers in a marketplace of ideas, rather than as mere conduits for the
ideas of the public.
In 1978, in FCC v. Pacifica Foundation," the Supreme
Court further eroded the public trust model by ignoring the scarci-
ty rationale, the rationale upon which the public trust model had
been based.' At issue in Pacifica was whether the FCC had the
power to regulate indecent radio broadcasts. 1 The Court held
that it did; neither the First Amendment nor Section 326 of the
Communications Act, 2 forbid the FCC to do so. 3  Under the
First Amendment, the Court reasoned, the program in question
(George Carlin's "Seven Dirty Words" monologue) was deserving
of less than heightened scrutiny because of both its content and its
context.' The content of the program was indecent,15 and the
program took place in the context of broadcast communication,
the regulation of which is subject to less stringent constitutional
limitations than print. communication. 6
In Pacifica, the Court took a fundamentally different tack
than it had in Red Lion. It focused on broadcasters as speakers,
rather than on the public as listeners, seeming to take for granted
that the "speakers," and thus those whose First Amendment rights
were being protected, were broadcasters. 7  Most importantly,
however, the Court's approach differed from Red Lion in that it
did not rely on the scarcity rationale-the linchpin of the public
229. 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
230. See supra notes 47-51 and accompanying text (discussing how the scarcity ratio-
nale underlies the public trust model of broadcast regulation).
231. See Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 735.
232. 47 U.S.C. § 326 (1994).
233. See Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 738, 748-51. Although section 326 prohibits FCC censor-
ship, the FCC had found its power to regulate indecent broadcasting in two different
statutes: 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (1976) (forbidding use of "any obscene, indecent, or profane
language by means of radio communications") and 47 U.S.C. § 303(g) (1994) (requiring
FCC to encourage "larger and more effective use of radio in the public interest").
234. See Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 747-48, 750.
235. See U at 748-51.
236. See id at 748.
237. See id. ("Thus, although other speakers cannot be licensed ... a broadcaster
may be deprived of his license and his forum if the Commission decides that such an
action would serve 'the public interest, convenience, and necessity."').
[Vol.46:611
RIGHTS IN THE BROADCAST SPECTRUM
trust mode1 8-- to explain why broadcasted speech was subject to
decreased First Amendment protection. Abandoning the scarcity
rationale and the concept of public ownership, the Court asserted
two characteristics that it claimed set broadcasting apart from
other media: broadcasting is "uniquely accessible to children, ' 239
and has a "uniquely pervasive presence."2'
The shift away from the public trust model and toward a
private market model in First Amendment jurisprudence continued
in FCC v. League of Women Voters.24' In League of Women Vot-
ers, the Supreme Court held unconstitutional Section 399 of the
Public Broadcasting Act of 1967,242 which forbade any "noncom-
mercial educational broadcasting station which receives a grant
from the Public Broadcasting Corporation" to "engage in editorial-
izing. 243 The Court used the rhetoric of the public trust mod-
el,' 4 but noted that the "prevailing rationale for broadcast regu-
lation"-scarcity of the electromagnetic spectrum-had been crit-
icized.245 Although the Court declined to reconsider its approach
absent some signal from Congress or the FCC, it did not rely on
the relative priority of the public's First Amendment rights as it
had in Red Lion. Instead, the Court treated broadcasters as par-
ticipants in a marketplace, focusing on their First Amendment
rights by treating the issue as one of editorial expression. "Section
399 plainly operates to restrict the expression of editorial opinion
on matters of public importance, and, as we have repeatedly ex-
plained, communication of this kind is entitled to the most exact-
ing degree of First Amendment protection."24 The Court bal-
anced broadcasters' speech rights against the public's interest in
receiving a "balanced presentation of information on issues of pub-
238. See supra notes 47-51 and accompanying text.
239. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 749.
240. Id. at 748.
241. 468 U.S. 364 (1984).
242. Pub. L. No. 90-129, § 201(8), 81 Stat. 368, 370 (1967) (codified at 47 U.S.C.
§ 399).
243. 468 U.S. at 366.
244. See id. at 377 ("[G]iven spectrum scarcity, those who are granted a license to
broadcast must serve in a sense as fiduciaries for the public. .... ).
245. Id. at 376 n.11. After citing several cases in which it had relied upon the scarcity
rationale to uphold government constraints upon what may be broadcast, the Court noted
several criticisms of the rationale. It concluded by stating that it was unprepared to re-
consider the longstanding approach without a nod from Congress or the FCC.
246. Id. at 375-76 (citations omitted).
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lic importance that otherwise might not be addressed if con-
trol... were left entirely in the hands of those who own and
operate broadcasting stations.""24
In one important respect the analysis in League of Women
Voters turns Red Lion on its head. Whereas in Red Lion the
Court had balanced vague First Amendment interests of broadcast-
ers against specific First Amendment rights of the public, in later
cases it balanced specific First Amendment rights of broadcasters
against vague First Amendment interests of the public. By
prioritizing broadcasters' rights, rather than the public's, the Su-
preme Court has followed Congress and the FCC in treating
broadcasters more like participants in a market than public trust-
ees. In doing so, it has strengthened broadcasters' rights to control
content and exclude others from use of their allotted spectrum,
and has legitimated the shift to the private market model.
FCC rulings also reflect this shift in First Amendment juris-
prudence. The demise of the Fairness Doctrine, which had guaran-
teed access to broadcasting facilities for issues of public importance
and which had been upheld in Red Lion,24 came about through
FCC actions, albeit with some help from the courts. In 1985, the
FCC filed its Fairness Doctrine Report.249 In it, the FCC dis-
cussed the constitutionality of the Fairness Doctrine, but declined
to decide the issue, stating only that the Fairness Doctrine had not
worked as planned.' A short time after the report was filed,
the FCC was ordered by the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia to investigate the constitutionality of the Fairness Doc-
trine;"' it did so and concluded that the doctrine was uncon-
stitutional. 2 The decision to abandon the Fairness Doctrine
indicates that the public's right to hear a variety of opinions no
longer holds priority over a broadcaster's right to control use of a
portion of the electromagnetic spectrum. In short, the FCC's aban-
donment of the Fairness Doctrine had the effect of shifting First
247. Id. at 377.
248. See supra notes 92-97 and accompanying text.
249. In re Inquiry into Section 73.1910 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations
Concerning the General Fairness Doctrine Obligations of Broadcast Licensees, 102
F.C.C.2d 142 (1985).
250. Id at 148-157, 246.
251. Meredith Corp. v. FCC, 809 F.2d 863, 874 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
252. See In re Syracuse Peace Council, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 2 F.C.C.
5043, 5047-52 (1987).
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Amendment rights from the public (where they resided during the
Red Lion era) to broadcasters.
CONCLUSION
The conflict between the public trust model and the private
market model is not over. Although the latter dominates current
regulatory philosophy, and licensees are treated essentially as par-
ticipants in a market, many commentators and regulators still
adhere at varying degrees to the public trust model. Even the
current FCC Chairman, Reed Hundt, has stated that the FCC
should take a more aggressive stance in requiring broadcasters to
fulfill their obligations to serve the public interestP3 He bases
these calls for increased responsibility on the concept of public
ownership of the electromagnetic spectrum, failing to recognize
that public ownership is no longer the dominant paradigm of
broadcast regulation.
Broadcast licensees still face public interest obligations in their
roles as private market participants.5' Nonetheless, those obliga-
tions no longer define their roles, as the Communications Act of
1934 intended 55 The public's rights in the broadcast spectrum
have been overtaken by those of broadcasters, and the public trust
concept has been overshadowed by a vision of broadcasters as
private market participants. The rise of stronger private property
rights for broadcasters has had both good and bad effects. The
purpose of this Note has not been to discuss those effects; instead,
it has merely described how stronger private property rights have
come to be. At a minimum, however, these rights have made First
Amendment law more consistent and spectrum use more economi-
cally efficient, and have reduced some of the perverse incentives
related to the allocation of a scarce resource without regard to
cost.
Perhaps more significant, however, are the effects that
strengthened private property rights have had and continue to
253. See Hundt, supra note 11, at 1094, 1096.
254. See Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 309 (1994).
255. See Scripps-Howard v. FCC, 316 U.S. 4, 14 (1942) ("The purpose of the Act was
to protect the public interest in communications."); see also FCC v. Pottsville Broad. Co.,
309 U.S. 134, 137-38 (1940) ("[I]n granting, denying modifying or revoking licenses for
the operations of stations, 'public convenience, interest, or necessity' was the touchstone
for the exercise of the commission's authority.").
1996]
650 DUKE LAW JO URNAL [Vol. 46:611
have on broadcast policy. Difficulties in formulating broadcast
policy are usually blamed on the political intractability of broad-
casters. Those who blame broadcasters in this way fail to see a
deeper problem-that political intractability is the result of
broadcasters' enlarged private property rights in the electromagnet-
ic spectrum. The stronger the broadcasters' long-term or potential
long-term interests in the electromagnetic spectrum become, the
more this political intractability will grow. It is irresponsible of the
FCC and Congress to blame only broadcasters for the rise of
private interests in broadcast regulation. After all, the FCC and
Congress, albeit with some prodding, have been the agents of the
change.
